[OPINION] The Navy’s submarine program: That sinking feeling

The Philippine Navy’s submarine acquisition program was again placed in the spotlight during a recent interview of Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. He opined that the Navy should look instead at unmanned systems as an alternative. 

This does not augur well for the program, which will likely remain in limbo during Teodoro’s watch. At this point, it might be instructive to revisit the rationale for the Navy’s submarine acquisition program and address some of the premises laid out in Teodoro’s interview.

In 2016, the Navy completed its capability plan to serve as the basis for its Horizon 2 and 3 submissions under the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Plan. The plan called for five force packages that dealt with exclusive economic zone (EEZ) protection, territorial defense, maritime governance, maritime domain awareness, and logistics. Over the past years, the plan has likely undergone several revisions, and its latest iteration would reflect the Marcos administration’s policies.  

In 2016, the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) was considered the most serious threat to the country’s maritime interests, particularly in the West Philippine Sea. At the time, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFMM) were still at their nascent stage of employment for grayzone missions. We were dealing with an adversarial navy with more ships in its inventory, complemented by an industrial base and shipbuilding that churns out new destroyers and frigates annually. The EEZ protection package called for an asymmetric solution to mitigate the PLAN’s numerical advantage, hence the proposal to develop submarine and land-based missile capabilities.  

From control to denial

Back then, a symmetrical approach based on a “sea control strategy” was simply unattainable given the Navy’s limited resources. Thus, an asymmetrical solution was conceived, premised on a “sea denial strategy.’” A study considered the deterrent effect of a single submarine launched in an operational area and matched against a flotilla of an adversary’s ships.

With a submarine on patrol along our EEZ, Beijing would have second thoughts in parading their navy close to our coastal areas in Zambales, Mindoro, and Palawan islands. When employed as an intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) platform, a submarine can monitor and track surface contacts and acquire targets in case of conflict. As part of the kill chain, it can vector missiles launched from mainland Luzon or Palawan, such as the Brahmos anti-ship missile from India. 

Building a submarine squadron from scratch is an expensive proposition.

Those in the Department of National Defense (DND) and other parties opposing the program have actively campaigned against it in the background. At the heart of their visceral objection is the prohibitive acquisition cost, inclusive of maintenance and support requirements, and the long-term impact on the budget given the funds needed to sustain it over the years. 

Such criticism has merit. In the negotiations with proponents, it was made clear that the Navy was not merely acquiring a platform, but an entire capability. This involved the establishment of a submarine squadron, support facilities, crew training, complemented by the creation of an industrial base, the transfer of technology, and investment in STEM education in government-run universities. Instead of a solely modernization project, the Navy considered packaging it as a national project given the cost and scope being considered. 

However, other points arising from Teodoro’s interview need further discussion. 

First off, it will take seven to ten years after contract signing before a submarine can be delivered. In this period, there are preparations undertaken to train the crew, set up a support facility, and develop the C4ISR infrastructure, among others. Postponing the decision to acquire pushes the actual program more or less twenty years down the road. By that time, the strategic landscape in the South China Sea might already be irreversible, and in China’s favor.

Second, if the DND was seriously looking at substitute capabilities for the immediate horizon, then the Navy should be acquiring low-cost sea denial systems such as: (1) additional Acero-class missile boats to guard the SLOCS, (2) naval mines, (3) unmanned surface and sub-surface platforms, and (4) short-range anti-ship missile batteries deployable in isolated islands, among others.

To deal with the CCG and militia, we need to set up a local drone factory under the Self-Reliance Defense Program (SRDP), which can develop, assemble, and sustainably deliver all types of drones. The Air Force, on the other hand, should be acquiring maritime strike aircraft to help interdict PLAN vessels encroaching on our waters. Absent these measures, Teodoro’s proposition becomes mere lip service. 

Third, a submarine is a navy’s apex predator. It is not used merely as an escort, merchant shipping, or interior lines of communication. In the 2016 capability plan, a ‘cost-imposition strategy’ will be in play in case of an actual conflict with China. In such a scenario, submarines will be tasked to attack Chinese merchant shipping along its sea routes passing within or adjacent to the Philippine archipelago. Given that the Chinese economy is heavily reliant on maritime trade routes connecting it to the Americas, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East for trade and resources, threatening their trade lifeline should have a deterrent effect. American submarine tactics against Japanese merchant shipping during WW2 validate this approach. 

WPS remains indefensible

However, the expansion of the Navy’s surface fleet, starting from the Jose Rizal-class FFGs to the Miguel Malvar-class corvettes, and Rajah Sulayman-class OPVs reflects a shift from a sea denial to a sea control strategy. Whether this was a deliberate change in approach or the unintended consequence of an ad hoc acquisition decision remains to be seen. 

What seems to have been forgotten in this acquisition binge is the fact that the West Philippine Sea remains militarily indefensible in actual conflict. Investing in a large surface force to deploy in open waters against a superior PLAN fleet does not appear sound. 

However, to make the best out of the current conditions, the Navy might as well organize at least two surface action groups (SAGs) from these new classes of ships along with the older Tarlac-class LPDs. These SAGS can patrol the West Philippine Sea unilaterally and show the flag, or conduct combined operations with the US and other partner navies. 

In the end, the journey of the Philippine Navy’s submarine acquisition program was never easy. Given the trajectory of indecision across two administrations, it might never be realized at all. 

If this is the case, it might be better to kill the program now, put a cap on the surface force, and reallocate resources to other systems that can implement the Navy’s sea denial strategy. – Rappler.com

Retired Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong was formerly vice commander of the Philippine Navy.